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ABSTRACT 
 
This study empirically examines whether the capital structure for natural monopolies (parastatals) 
dynamically responds to macroeconomic conditions. It further examines whether the balance sheet 
channel theory holds for this industry sample. The study adopts a double sampling approach from the 
population of water boards in South Africa (SA), which raise their capital in open financial markets. A 
quantitative research approach is adopted with a descriptive design to achieve relevant deductions. 
Panel techniques are used in the descriptive design for the regressions. 
The study finds that leverage partly dynamically responds to macroeconomic conditions. Furthermore, 
the evidence shows that inflation is an exception that has no significant relationship with leverage. 
The balance sheet channel theory is found to hold for water boards that access capital in open financial 
markets. Specifically, empirical evidence shows that changes in the interest rate have a delayed impact 
on the companies’ characteristics, including capital structure. 
Overall, our evidence suggests that water boards in SA need to consider the benefits of linking financial 
policies to the business cycle and that their policies should consider the delayed effect of interest rate 
changes. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
 
Perkins, Fedderke, and Luiz (2005) find that inadequate investment in economic infrastructure can 
lead to bottlenecks and missed opportunities for economic growth. Furthermore, they note that 
executing the correct project at the appropriate time is imperative and that the basis for choosing 
each project should be a cost-benefit analysis. Although they define economic infrastructure in a 
way that does not include some important production units i.e. water and sanitation. Fourie 
(2006) includes water and sanitation and other producing units for public goals as part of the 
economic infrastructure. 
 
Institutions that use leverage and/or other external financing to develop their economic 
infrastructure need to optimize their capital structure to ensure that no bottlenecks and missed 
opportunities occur. As shown in Figure 1, theory has identified four categories that influence 
capital structure decisions: 1) macroeconomic conditions, 2) firm characteristics, 3) industry 
characteristics (Bokpin, 2009; Frank & Goyal, 2009; Axelson, Jenkinson, StrÖMberg, & Weisbach, 
2013; Kayo & Kimura, 2011), and 4) time (Kayo & Kimura, 2011). 
 
Figure 1 Influences on or pillars of the capital structure 
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These four pillars frame the optimized capital structure, and they are guided by multiple 
arguments. This study focuses on companies in the same industry; as a result, the industry 
influence is not be investigated. Other studies have used firm characteristics to explain capital 
structure behavior for predictive investigations through tax-based theories, such as the pecking 
order theory or the trade-off theory (Pandey, 2001). This study does not focus on such predictive 
investigations; thus, firm characteristics is not be investigated. The investigation is conducted over 
the same time period; however, the evolution of the capital structure over time due to 
macroeconomic shocks is of interest here. Therefore, the study focuses on two of the four pillars: 
macroeconomic conditions and time. The first pillar investigates how the macroeconomic 
conditions influence capital structure, and the second pillar examines the intermediary effect of 
time on capital structure. 
 
Figure 2. Pillars of the capital framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the literature, financial leverage/debt is used as an indicator of capital structure (Frank & Goyal, 
2009; Delcoure, 2007; Korajczy & Levy, 2003). Different variations have been used to define 
leverage, but most authors have used the 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 
 ratio (Korajczy & Levy, 2003; Frank & Goyal, 
2009; Delcoure, 2007) as an indicator. This study uses the same indicator. 
 
Korajczy and Levy (2003) argue that capital structure dynamically responds to macroeconomic 
conditions and financial constraints. Other authors, such as Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006), 
have argued that firms can benefit from linking their financial policies to the position of the 
economy in the business cycle. Furthermore, Akhtar (2012) find a strong relationship between 
capital structure and the business cycle. For the macroeconomic pillar, this study investigates 
these arguments and their validity for the potable bulk water industry in South Africa (SA). 
 
This pillar investigates whether a relationship exists between the capital structure and 
macroeconomic indicators, such as the following: 
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 Gross domestic product (GDP) (Kayo & Kimura, 2011; Bokpin, 2009; Axelson et al., 2013; 
Frank & Goyal, 2009) 
 Interest rate (Axelson et al., 2013) 
 Inflation (Bokpin, 2009; Frank & Goyal, 2009) 
 
Kayo and Kimura (2011) argue that “time cannot be ignored in the capital structure evolution”. 
They further indicate that time reflects a company’s macroeconomic shocks within a given year. 
In their findings, Lam, Zhang, and Lee (2013) emphasize the impact of time on the capital structure 
and country-specific variables. The macroeconomic shocks experienced by a firm within a given 
year are examined in studies on balance sheet channel theory. The balance sheet channel theory 
seeks to explain the influence of macroeconomic shocks (through monetary policy) on the firm’s 
income statement, the balance sheet, net worth, cash flow and even liquid assets (Bernanke & 
Gertler, 1995). 
 
Bernanke and Gertler’s (1995) methodology is adopted in this study to investigate the evolution 
of capital structure due to macroeconomic shocks. Their methodology tests whether a 
relationship exists between the interest coverage ratio (
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 
(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠+𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡)
) and the 
macroeconomic shocks represented by interest rate changes due to monetary policy changes over 
time. The time lapsed is represented by lags in the interest rate changes. 
 
Although firm characteristics are not be investigated in this study, their critical role in the optimal 
capital structure cannot be ignored, as they are primarily driven by the firm’s assets (Axelson et 
al., 2013). These assets can range from the firm’s cash flows (stable or instable), profitability, 
governance structure, and mix of tangible and intangible assets, among others. The dynamic 
nature of the firms’ characteristics thus drives the ideal optimal capital structure. Three schools 
of thought grapple with the optimal capital structure driven by firm characteristics: the 1) tax-
based, 2) modern and 3) norm-based theories. However, this study does not seek to determine 
which theory best describes the existing phenomenon based on firm characteristics. 
 
The outcome of this study is informing the creation of a framework for natural monopolies that is 
capable of responding effectively to macroeconomic conditions and their shocks over time when 
they change within the parameters of the study’s findings. These findings then become a 
framework for capital structure optimization for natural monopolies in the bulk water sector 
limited to the South Africa context. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Given the context of the study outlined above, the following research questions guide this 
research: 
 
 Does the capital structure for natural monopolies (parastatals) dynamically respond to 
macroeconomic conditions? 
 Does the balance sheet channel theory hold for natural monopolies (parastatals), or do 
macroeconomic shocks have an impact on capital structure over time? 
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1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Inadequate investment in economic infrastructure can lead to bottlenecks and missed 
opportunities for economic growth (Perkins et al., 2005). Inadequate investment also occurs due 
to investment inefficiencies based on poor policies or lack of frameworks that do not consider 
investment timing and macro-economic conditions. Sanchez-Robles (1998) also notes the 
importance of efficiency for maximum output, which is suggested as a challenge currently.  
 
Economic growth is one of the critical macroeconomic conditions that have an impact on 
unemployment, interest rates and equity markets etc. Thus, a lack of or inefficient investment in 
economic infrastructure can have devastating effects on the economic growth for the entire 
country. Sanchez-Robles (1998) emphasizes this point by documenting a positive relationship 
between economic growth and infrastructure investment. Esty, Chavich, and Sesia (2014) have 
even gone so far as to state that infrastructure investment is related to a one-for-one increase in 
GDP. 
 
Noting that Governments normally controls economic infrastructure through management and 
investments through their entities and departments. Thus, government officials need to make 
informed decisions to ensure that the country does not experience economic infrastructure 
bottlenecks. In South Africa, state owned entities are one of the critical units used to develop and 
manage economic infrastructure. They make the day to day management decisions as well as 
investment decisions, thus playing a critical role in economic growth.  
 
Thus, a lack of a framework to guide officials may lead to inefficiencies in their financial policies 
thus negatively affecting daily decision making. Finance policies must guide the timing of the 
investment (aligned with the firm needs) and also consider macro-economic conditions to ensure 
the delivery of economic infrastructure. Without a framework to guide these decisions and ensure 
investment efficiencies, economic infrastructure bottlenecks will undoubtedly occur at some 
point. One such inevitable bottleneck has been observed in the case of Eskom in South Africa—a 
natural monopoly producing electricity. Thus, if a framework is not established to prevent such 
bottlenecks, a similar complication is possible in the bulk water industry. 
 
1.4 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
Therefore, this study aims to use empirical data to create a capital structure optimization 
framework for bulk water natural monopolies (parastatals), such as Rand Water, to ensure 
sustainable bulk water production through the development and maintenance of the economic 
infrastructure. 
 
 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
If capital structure frameworks are not created and used effectively and efficiently to optimize the 
capital structure to meet future water demands, a water crisis is seemingly inevitable in SA, a 
water-scarce, drought-prone developing country. Such a crisis could lead to inadequate capacity 
in the water infrastructure and negatively affect the South African economy. The water 
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infrastructure is a critical facility that makes business activity possible (Fourie, 2006); without 
water, no life can exist—let alone business activity.  
 
Note that Rand Water’s economic infrastructure mainly supplies the Gauteng province with 
potable water, primarily from raw water procured from another country (Lesotho) through the 
Lesotho Highland scheme. In addition, as a province, Gauteng accounts for the largest share of 
SA’s population at 24% (11.2 million people), contributing 33.9% to SA’s GDP and 10% to the 
continent’s GDP (Gautengonline, 2016). If a capital structure optimization and investment 
decision fails, inadequate infrastructure may have a negative impact on the local, provincial and 
national levels. 
 
Based on empirical evidence, this research provides guidance on how to use a framework to 
achieve capital structure optimization for natural monopolies within the bulk water industry. This 
guidance will help policymakers in bulk water natural monopolies, such as Rand Water, to use the 
optimized capital structure approach to deliver a sustainable economic water infrastructure. 
 
1.6 OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY 
 
This is a descriptive study that has adopted a quantitative research approach and double sampling. 
Descriptive research collects information concerning the current status of particular phenomena 
and defines which conditions or variables exist within specific situations (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). 
The phenomena of interest is the dynamic nature of capital structure with macroeconomic 
conditions and the impact of time on the company characteristics. 
Panel techniques are used for the regression between the independent and dependent variables. 
The use of panel techniques is common for leverage and macroeconomic regression  studies, as 
demonstrated in the work of Korajczy and Levy (2003). This is due to the cross-sectional nature of 
the data, the exclusive use of panel techniques would be expected; however other studies like  
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) have used VAR models. Panel techniques are used to analyze both 
pillars, as the data meets the panel data criteria defined by Brooks (2014). 
The study investigates two regressions, the first is the relationship between leverage and 
macroeconomic conditions and the second one the Coverage ratio with the changes in interest 
rate and their lags. This is aimed at answering the questions of the study. Two critical tests are 
conducted to ensure that the results are not spurious and these are the unit root test and the 
cointegration test. Descriptive statistics are also used to analyze the data for outliers and to better 
understand the raw data. 
 
1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 
This research report is structured as follows: 
Chapter 1 introduces the research, including the problem statement, the research questions, 
purpose, the significance and the limitations of the study. 
Chapter 2 outlines a review of the key literature and concepts on macroeconomic conditions and 
capital structure theories. This chapter closes by describing the essence of the literature. 
12 
 
Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology used to address the research questions. 
Chapter 4 presents the results and the discussion of the empirical analysis on the sampled utilities 
over the 10-year period considered in this study. 
Chapter 5 presents the conclusions and the resulting optimized capital structure framework of the 
study. 
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CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines all the relevant literature with regard to this study. This review includes 
studies that are relevant to this investigation and some that are not. Different arguments from 
the literature are consulted to inform the use of some variables over others, presenting different 
schools of thought across of relevant subjects related to capital structure. This review first 
introduces the indicators of capital structure, identifying the ones relevant for this study. It then 
presents studies that examine all four pillars of capital structure (see Figure 1). 
 
Bokpin (2009) notes that there is a relationship between indicators of macroeconomic conditions 
(e.g., GDP per capita), and firms’ capital structure. However, Frank and Goyal (2009) highlight that 
some indicators of macroeconomic conditions (e.g., inflation) do not show a reliable relationship 
with capital structure. Although Axelson et al. (2013) agree that a relationship exists between 
capital structure and some indicators of macroeconomic conditions, they also indicate that a 
relationship exists between firm characteristics and capital structure. 
 
Frank and Goyal (2009) agree to the relationships identified above, but they add industry as 
another factor. Kayo and Kimura (2011) investigated all the three identified relationships (the 
macroeconomic conditions, firm characteristics and industry), however they also include time as 
a fourth relationship/ a direct influencing factor. According to them firm characteristics and time 
best explain capital structure. Thus, according to Kayo and Kimura (2011), macroeconomic 
conditions and industry do not help explain capital structure. Therefore, in general, theory has 
identified four relationships that influence capital structure decisions (see Figure 1): 1) 
macroeconomic conditions, 2) firm characteristics, 3) industry and 4) time. All these findings will 
be discussed further in this chapter. 
 
 
2.2 Capital structure indicators 
 
Previous studies of capital structure have used financial leverage/debt as an indicator of capital 
structure (Frank & Goyal, 2009; Delcoure, 2007; Korajczy & Levy, 2003). Depending on the purpose 
of specific studies, different variations have been used to define book leverage. Most authors have 
used the 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 
 ratio (Korajczy & Levy, 2003; Frank & Goyal, 2009; Delcoure, 2007) as an 
indicator of capital structure; however, Axelson et al. (2013) use other variations such as 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 
𝐸𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑎
 
and 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 
𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
. In line with most studies, this study uses the 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 
 as an indicator of 
capital structure. 
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2.3 Macroeconomic conditions 
 
Korajczy and Levy (2003) argue that capital structure dynamically responds to macroeconomic 
conditions and financial constraints. They state that the optimal capital structure is countercyclical 
for a financially unconstrained sample and pro-cyclical for a financially constrained sample. 
Hackbarth et al. (2006) agree with this notion and further indicate that firms can benefit from 
linking their financial policies to the position of the economy in that business cycle. Akhtar (2012) 
agrees with this view based on a study conducted using four stages of the business cycle, which 
affirms a strong relationship between capital structure and the business cycle. She also indicates 
that this relationship is relevant when the cash flows depend on current economic conditions. 
 
Hackbarth et al. (2006) further argue that macroeconomic conditions should have a major 
influence on firms’ financing decisions, especially if the optimal capital structure is achieved by 
balancing tax benefits and bankruptcy costs factors. Since both of these factors depend on cash 
flows, both are also influenced by current economic conditions. Therefore, the dependence of the 
capital structure on macroeconomic conditions is evident. Thus, any economic movement should 
have an impact on the optimal capital structure. 
 
 
There are a number of indicators from previous capital structure studies used to define 
macroeconomic conditions, including the following: 
 GDP (Kayo & Kimura, 2011; Bokpin, 2009; Axelson et al., 2013; Frank & Goyal, 2009) 
 Interest rate (Axelson et al., 2013) 
 Inflation (Bokpin, 2009; Frank & Goyal, 2009) 
 Taxation (Frank & Goyal, 2009; Delcoure, 2007) 
 
2.4 Firm characteristics 
 
Firm characteristics are primarily driven by the firm’s assets (Axelson et al., 2013). These assets 
can range from the firm’s cash flows (stable or instable), profitability, governance structure, and 
mix of tangible and intangible assets, among others. Gwatidzo & Ojah (2009) investigate other 
drivers like tax, size and age in their study amongst the firm assets like profitability and assets. 
Depending on the country size and age have a role to play while tax was found to be insignificant 
for all countries and their samples.  
 
The dynamic nature of firm characteristics thus drives the ideal optimal capital structure. The 
following three schools of thought approach the optimal capital structure in different ways: 1) tax-
based theory, 2) modern theory and 3) norm-based theory. The tax-based model has two 
important theories of capital structure: 1) the trade-off theory and 2) the pecking order theory 
(Korajczyk & Levy, 2003 and Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001). 
 
Modern theory mainly has four models based on 1) agency costs, 2) asymmetric information, 3) 
behavior in the product or input market and 4) corporate control considerations (Harris & Raviv, 
1991). Myers (1993) refers to the agency-based theory as “an organisational theory of capital 
structure”, but he does not deny the validity of tax-based theories. However, he does indicate that 
“In the end none of these theories is completely satisfactory” (Myers, 1993), although they 
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attempt to provide give the firm’s view when applied. By contrast, norm-based theory is based on 
the idea that “the norms of decision makers can bridge the gap between New Classical economic 
theories and conflicting empirical evidence” (Lam et al., 2013). 
 
Delcoure (2007) highlights the existence cross-country differences in the capital structure, which 
are associated with differences related to country tax policies, bankruptcy, agency problems, 
moral hazard costs and information asymmetry. 
 
2.4.1 Taxed-based theories 
 
2.4.1.1 Trade-off theory 
 
 Myers (1984) and Korajczy and Levy (2003) agree that the trade-off theory is about balancing the 
tax benefits against the bankruptcy costs, thereby achieving an optimal capital structure.   Bradley, 
Jarrel and Kim (1984) partly agree; in their study they rest the optimum capital structure on the 
balance between tax advantages of debt and the leverage related cost including bankruptcy, 
agency and  loss of non-debt tax shield costs etc. Booth et al. (2001) state that the capital structure 
targets a balance that mirrors tax rates and bankruptcy costs, incorporating other firm 
characteristics such as asset type, business risk and profitability. These tax benefits or the relevant 
tax rate is derived from the interest tax shield due to tax rates on debt interest payments. The 
bankruptcy costs cover any costs ultimately incurred due to the actual bankruptcy (Dang, 2013). 
 
Other assets are incorporated, as identified by Booth et al. (2001), because companies want to 
use their tangible assets to provide lenders with security, thereby minimizing their risk should 
financial distress materialize (Delcoure, 2007). However, companies are not always balancing tax 
benefits and bankruptcy costs. According to DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011), companies 
sometimes deviate from this approach to address investments needs that might not result in the 
ideal balance. Ramjee and Gwatidzo (2012) then define a dynamic trade-off model as one in which 
firms attempt to quickly return to the targeted balance after an investment shock. 
 
Myers (1993) indicates that “the most telling evidence against the static trade-off theory is the 
strong inverse correlation between profitability and financial leverage. Within an industry, the 
most profitable firms borrow less, the least profitable borrow more”. When the trade-off theory 
is put into practice, the fundamental approach involves dynamically choosing the optimal leverage 
until the value of the firm is maximized (Bhamra, Kuehn, & Strebulaev, 2010) or minimizing the 
weighted average cost of capital (Firer, Ross, Westerfield & Jordan, 2012). 
 
2.4.1.2 Pecking order theory 
 
Myers (1984) and Korajczy and Levy (2003) define the pecking order theory as the preference for 
internal funding over external funding. Booth et al. (2001) argue that market imperfections are 
central with regard to the pecking order theory. They also indicate that “transaction costs and 
asymmetric information link the firm’s ability to undertake new investments to its internally 
generated funds”. As such, if the firms rely on external funding for growth, they choose debt over 
equity due to the asymmetry of information. However, Frank and Goyal (2009) suggest other 
causes; for instance, they argue that tax, agency and behavioral considerations may influence debt 
preferences. 
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Myers (1993) also argues that, in the pecking order theory, the debt ratio is not well-defined into 
a specific target as in the trade-off theory. Instead, the theory reasons according to the four logical 
principles: 
1. Dividend policies are difficult to change. 
2. Internal financing is preferred over external financing. 
3. The instrument considered cheapest and safest are chosen first. 
4. Due to the need for more external financing, a pecking order is used to prioritize options based 
on safety, risk, and cost considerations, but equity is normally the last resort. 
Gwatidzo & Ojah (2009) find evidence of the pecking order theory for listed African companies. 
Their findings indicate that they tend to rely more on internal funding and these findings are 
relevant. Although the context of the studies might not be the same but the natural monopolies 
being investigated are in South Africa which is within their study region as well. 
 
2.4.2 Modern models 
 
2.4.2.1 Agency costs 
 
Agency cost models are mainly used due to conflicts of interest (Harris & Raviv, 1991). Conflicts 
between managers and shareholders occur because managers’ benefit to a limited degree from 
the profits earned due to their activities. Managers are the only ones bearing the costs of 
responsible management, which results in profitable organizations; however, the managers’ 
benefits are limited, and mainly the shareholders benefit from the profits that the former 
generate (Harris & Raviv, 1991). Jensen (1986) states that shareholder pay-outs tend to create 
conflicts between the interests of shareholders and corporate managers (the agents). 
 
At the center of this conflict is resource control and the benefits of debt financing. For agents, 
resource control decreases when shareholder pay-outs to shareholders are executed. As a result, 
agents are exposed to external capital market scrutiny when they need to source funds to finance 
projects and/or enjoy personal benefits. If no pay-outs occur, resource control improves, thereby 
allowing agents to finance projects internally and to avoid capital market scrutiny (Jensen, 1986). 
Another source of conflict concerns the shareholder benefits associated with debt. Harris and 
Raviv (1991) state that the “debt contract gives equity holders an incentive to invest sub-
optimally”. The shareholders gain on debt returns, but the agents bear the brunt of the negative 
consequences if the investment fails because shareholders have limited liability. Drawing on the 
work of other authors, Harris and Raviv (1991) refer to the trade-off between the agency costs 
and benefits of debt as the optimal capital structure. 
 
2.4.2.2 Asymmetric information 
 
Private information is the backbone of the models that use asymmetric information. The market 
assumes that company insiders have private information related to potential investment 
opportunities and/or returns. As a result, the market views capital structure decisions as signals 
of this private information (Harris & Raviv, 1991). Stock price reactions to the exchange and  
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issuance of securities, leverage amounts and a firm’s alignment with the pecking order theory are 
the best predictors of asymmetric information (Harris & Raviv, 1991). 
 
In their dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions (whereby corporate 
insiders have superior knowledge of the firm’s investments), Morellec and Schürhoff (2011) show 
that firms with positive private information can time their corporate actions and capital structure 
to credibly signal the market. As a result, asymmetric information encourages firms with worthy 
prospects to fast track investments with better terms for the securities that they issue. They 
further find that informational asymmetries may translate into the trade-off theory rather than 
the pecking order theory. They predict that “the use of debt should decline with the quality of 
good types of investment opportunities, the volatility of the cash flow shock, bankruptcy costs, 
and operating leverage” (Morellec & Schürhoff, 2011). 
 
Leary and Roberts (2010) find that the pecking order is never able to accurately categorize more 
than 50% of the witnessed financing decisions. The pecking order only starts improving the 
predictability when alternative theories are considered. They find that the minimal pecking order 
behavior in the data is driven by incentive conflicts rather than information asymmetry. 
 
2.4.2.3 Behavior in the product or input market 
 
Models based on product/input market interfaces for capital structure have explored its 
relationship with product market strategies or product/input characteristics. They are 
characterized by two strategic variables: price and quantity. They focus on how the capital 
structure affects the product’s availability, service, quality and the brokering between the 
management and input merchants (Harris & Raviv, 1991). In their study, Brander and Lewis (1986) 
find that oligopolists tend to have more debt than monopolists in the long term. Oligopolists 
further increase their risk by implementing aggressive output policies, which result in increased 
debt. 
 
2.4.2.4 Corporate control considerations 
 
Harris and Raviv (1991) indicate that “capital structure affects the value of the firm, the probability 
of the takeover, and the price effects of takeover” because it helps determine the value of the 
firm because it contributes to the firm’s asset value. This asset value then influences whether the 
firm can be taken over (considering other factors such as free cash flow and debt) and, if so, at 
what price. 
 
The theory of capital structure in relation to takeover contests is found to have the following 
characteristics (Harris & Raviv, 1991) associated with short-term changes in capital structure: 
1. Takeover targets have, on average, higher debt levels, and their stock prices react 
positively. 
2. Leverage is negatively related to the success of the tender offer. 
3. Targets of proxy fights have, on average, less debt than targets of unsuccessful tender 
offers. 
4. The premium paid to target shareholders increases as the target’s equity and debt 
increases. 
5. Costly takeover targets have less debt. 
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6. High debt takeovers have greater potential. 
 
2.4.3 Norm-based theory of capital structure 
 
The norm-based theory of capital structure is based on Akerlof’s (2007) claim that “the norms of 
decision makers can bridge the gap between New Classical economic theories and conflicting 
empirical evidence”. Lam et al. (2013) argue that their study is among the first to operationalize 
the direct link between national culture and capital culture through managerial norms. They argue 
that traditional capital structure theories assume that agents are sensible; unfortunately, the 
authors provide empirical evidence that proves otherwise. According to Lam et al. (2013), agents 
are affected by behavioral factors (i.e., managerial traits and biases), which then affect financial 
decisions. 
 
Furthermore, Lam et al. (2013) define norms “as implicit or explicit rules that a group (or society) 
uses to identify acceptable and unacceptable values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours”. They 
argue that people can deviate from rational reasoning to conform to norms, a concept aligned 
with that of Akerlof (2007). Furthermore, Akerlof (2007) emphasizes that the community knows, 
generates, observes, and abides by norms. In their study, Lam et al. (2013) introduce two new 
theories: 1) the manager–subordinate norm and 2) the manager–environment norm; they argue 
that these theories can explain capital structure decisions. 
 
2.5 Industry-level category/ determinant 
 
According to Kayo and Kimura (2011), certain industry characteristics can be reasonably expected 
to influence capital structure due to the firm’s strategic approach and external factors. They argue 
that industry dynamism and munificence are two factors that can influence capital structure. 
Simerly and Li (2000) demonstrate that the trend is to analyze the environmental dynamics of the 
industry (i.e., industry dynamism) rather than the direct influence of the environmental 
characteristics on leverage. This trend relates to a company’s business risk, and firms in similar 
industries tend to experience similar business risks due to similar costs for skilled labor and raw 
materials and similar technologies (Kayo & Kimura, 2011). Thus, “it is predicted that the larger the 
business risk, the smaller the level of firm leverage” (Kayo & Kimura, 2011). 
 
However, the effect of profitability on leverage cannot be generalized due to firm characteristics 
that may be aligned with the pecking order theory or the trade-off theory (Kayo & Kimura, 2011). 
 
2.6 Time 
 
Kayo and Kimura (2011) argue that “time cannot be ignored in the capital structure evolution”. 
They further indicate that time reflects a company’s macroeconomic shocks within a given year. 
This observation seems to contradict the findings of Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), who 
find that capital structure seems to be stable over time. Kayo and Kimura (2011) indicate that 
these findings do not necessarily contradict one another because the samples used in the two 
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studies are different. The main difference is that the sample of Kayo and Kimura (2011) includes 
more developed countries, while Lemon et al.’s (2008) sample includes 40 developing countries. 
Lam et al. (2013) then find that the leverage ratios in multiple countries and time are significantly 
affected by four environments: 1) economic, 2) financial, 3) legal and 4) tax environments. Their 
findings emphasize the impact of time on the capital structure and country-specific variables. 
 
Titman and Tsyplakov (2007) demonstrate in their study the existence of time-series variations of 
debt ratios. This is an indication as well of the impact of time on debt ratios. Although the context 
of their study was different, their findings that companies move slowly towards their targeted 
debt ratio after an impact in time. This is a demonstration of the time effect, within the dynamic 
environment of incorporating continuous investment and financial choices. 
 
 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) identify two critical theories that are relevant to economic responses 
through monetary policy changes. Monetary policy changes are normally necessitated by changes 
in macroeconomic conditions. These two critical theories are the bank lending and balance sheet 
channel theories. In their paper, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) question the relevance of the 
“controversial” bank lending theory, while they argue that the balance sheet theory “seems fairly 
well established” (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995). 
 
2.6.1 Bank lending channel theory 
 
The bank lending channel seeks to explain the influence of macroeconomic conditions (through 
monetary policy) on the number of loans supplied by depository institutions (Bernanke & Gertler, 
1995). Bernanke and Gertler (1995) doubt the relevance of the bank lending channel theory, but 
Zulkhibri (2013) disagrees with their assessment. In his paper, he indicates that the bank lending 
channel theory applies to emerging market economies or transition economies if the panel data 
approach is used. Observing banks in France, Germany, Italy and Spain, Favero, Giavazzi, and 
Flabbi (1999) find no evidence of a significance response of bank loans to monetary tightening. 
However, in a study conducted in Spain, Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina (2012), analyzing 
the extensive margin of lending with loan applications, find that lower GDP growth (during periods 
of higher short-term interest rates) reduces the number of loans granted, especially by banks with 
low capital or liquidity. 
 
Nilsen (2002) finds that the bank lending channel theory is valid; he finds that small financial 
institutions increase trade credit as a substitute for loans, which indicates that the demand for 
loans increases. Thus, according to Nilsen (2002), this finding supports the bank lending channel 
theory, as banks do not voluntarily cut loans; instead, they issue a less-desirable alternative. He 
also finds evidence of large firms also increasing trade credit, which further supports the existence 
of the of the bank lending channel. 
 
The study of Zulkhibri (2013) supports the bank lending channel theory in some countries. A 
number of factors influence these findings, including the following: 
 Market segment 
 Bank liquidity 
 Bank role 
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 Flexibility between insured and uninsured sources of funding 
 
2.6.2 Balance sheet channel theory 
 
The balance sheet channel seeks to explain the influence of macroeconomic conditions (through 
monetary policy) on a firm’s income statement, balance sheet, net worth, cash flow and even 
liquid assets (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995). The empirical work of Villegas Salazar (2009) supports 
the balance sheet channel theory for non-financial institutions in Colombia during the 1995–2007  
period. Shabbir (2012) also finds similar results in Pakistan, arguing that the “monetary 
contraction increases the financial expenses of the firms, reduces their profits and squeezes their 
cash flow”. 
 
Angelopoulou and Gibson (2009) find that the balance sheet channel theory is important in 
explaining the macroeconomic changes in the manufacturing sector in the United Kingdom. They 
further conclude that financially constrained firms are more cash flow sensitive during periods of 
low growth. Sousa and Gameiro (2013) do not find any substantial evidence of systematic 
governmental behavior in response to monetary shocks. In their empirical study, they do find that 
macroeconomic changes in Portugal, materializing in monetary policy shocks, have a 
contractionary effect on the economic activities, increasing the financing needs of the household 
and the non-financial institution. 
 
2.7 Essence of the research 
 
This research essentially aims to ensure that economic infrastructure planning is customized 
(within the bulk water industry in SA) to respond to macroeconomic conditions and their impact 
over time. It also seeks to use empirical evidence from previous similar studies to describe the 
existing phenomenon. The many empirical studies referred to in this chapter presents findings 
that must be scrutinized to determine their relevance or be used to describe the phenomenon. 
These findings include but not limited to the following: 
 
1) The relevance of linking financial policies to the economy (Hackbarth et al., 2006), 
if relevant. 
2)  The potential of planning leverage considering monetary contractions their 
impact over time. However If they do have an impact, they increase financial 
expenses, resulting in squeezed cash flows (Shabbir, 2012). However, if monetary 
contractions do not have an impact, as in the study of Sousa and Gameiro (2013) 
on government institutions, then they do not need to be considered in the 
financial planning policies. 
3) The relevance of other empirical findings in explaining the bulk water industry 
phenomenon in SA e.g., deviations to address investment needs, even if doing so 
not optimal (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Whited, 2011). 
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CHAPTER 3: Research Methodology 
 
The literature review in the previous chapter covers other studies in this field, presenting their 
arguments and findings. This chapter discusses the methodology used to answer the research 
questions and to propose a capital structure framework model. Creswell (2013) argues that 
research methods involve the researchers’ intended forms of data collection, analysis and 
interpretation. Therefore, this chapter first justifies the selected research approach and 
methodology in terms of how they relate to the stated research problem. The chapter then 
describes the research analysis, outlining the variables and model creation. It further proposes 
how the results should be interpreted, using the selected statistical procedures with a specific 
reference to decision making. 
 
As part of the aforementioned research methods, this chapter also covers sample collection, 
sampling strategy and units of analysis. Finally, the chapter concludes by highlighting the 
methodologies adopted to ensure that the results are reliable. 
 
3.1 Data Collection 
 
The research approach and design guides the data collection. The next two subsections outline 
the logic of the chosen approach and design. They then describe the population studied, the 
sampling procedure and the data collection process. 
 
3.1.1 Research Approach 
 
Research approaches are plans and procedures that cover the steps from broad assumptions to 
detailed methods of data collection, analysis and interpretation. The most common research 
approaches use qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). 
 
Qualitative research is the analysis, recording and attempt to unpack the deeper meaning and 
significance of human experience and behavior (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). This 
approach explores and attempts to understand the meaning that individuals or groups ascribe to 
a social or human problem. Myers (2009) states that qualitative research is designed to help 
researchers understand people and the social and cultural contexts in which they live. Johnson 
and Christensen (2010) define quantitative research as the collection and conversion of data into 
numerical forms to enable statistical calculations and conclusions to be easily drawn. Quantitative 
research examines the links between variables to test objective theories. Mixed method mixes the 
qualitative and quantitative methods. 
 
This study applies quantitative research methods because it aims to link variables and draw 
conclusions regarding their relationships. 
 
3.1.2 Research Design 
 
Lewis and Saunders (2012) differentiate between three types of research designs, namely, 
exploratory, explanatory and descriptive designs. An exploratory study is conducted when little is 
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known about the situation at hand and the objective is to discover insights. Explanatory studies 
test whether one variable causes another to change. These studies normally use experiments as 
a data collection method. 
 
Descriptive research collects information concerning the current status of particular phenomena 
and defines which conditions or variables exist within specific situations (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). 
This research is a descriptive study investigates the dynamic relationship between capital 
structure and macroeconomic conditions; furthermore their impact over time in the bulk water 
industry in SA. This study gathers information concerning the current status of capital structure 
phenomena in state-owned bulk water monopolies and define what exists with respect to the 
identified variables within phenomena. 
 
Theoretical propositions are tested with regard to the two pillars identified, macroeconomic 
conditions and time. The phenomena of interest in the macroeconomic pillar is its dynamic 
relationship to capital structure. While the balance sheet channel theory is of interest in the time 
pillar. Thus, as this study seeks to use a research strategy to test theoretical propositions, it adopts 
a deductive approach (Lewis & Saunders, 2012). 
 
3.1.3 Sampling and data collection process 
 
In a study, the population is the entire group being investigated (Sekaran, 2003). The population 
in this study consists of nine water boards in SA: Rand Water, Umngeni Water, Mhlathuze Water, 
Sedibeng Water, Amatola Water, Bloem Water, Magalies Water, Lepelle Northern Water and 
Overberg Water (Department of Water and Sanitation, 2014). According to the Department of 
Water and Sanitation (2014), water boards derive their mandate from the Water Service Act of 
1997, and they operate under Schedule 3B of the Public Finance Management Act as national 
government business enterprises. 
 
The main purpose of the water boards is to provide bulk water services to the municipalities in 
which they operate and to other entities (i.e., mines, industries, etc.). This study utilizes a share of 
this population, which Sekaran (2003) refers to as a subset of the population, which allows a 
researcher to draw conclusions about the population after studying it. According to Sekaran 
(2003), the two most common sampling methods are probability and non-probability sampling. 
 
Probability sampling is used when parts of the population have a known probability of being 
chosen as subjects in the sample. This type of sampling is also chosen when representativeness is 
critical for the study, whereas non-probability sampling is used when it is not critical. The 
probability sampling methods can be classified into random, systematic, cluster, area and double 
sampling. All these sampling methods have their advantages and disadvantages, and they are used 
for specific reasons and purposes. For instance, random sampling and systematic sampling are 
advantageous for generalization, while double sampling is used to gather more information from 
a subset of the sample. Since this study aims to create a capital structure optimization framework 
that prevents economic infrastructure bottlenecks in the bulk water industry, focusing on an 
unrestricted subset within the water board sample is critical. Water boards that do not raise 
capital from markets are restricted to internal returns (revenues) and commercial banks, which 
limits the capital available compared to those that are able raise capital from the financial markets. 
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When water boards cannot access markets, a massive bottleneck already exists in the bulk water’s 
economic infrastructure. Thus, these water boards are not of interest here because their capital-
raising approaches are already limited. The suitable sampling design is probability sampling, using 
a double sampling technique. Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) statistics identify only two water 
boards that raise money in public financial markets: the Rand and Umngeni water boards. These 
water boards thus represent 22% of the population. However, due to the small population size, 
the ideal sample is close to the total population. This study aims to gather more information from 
a subset of water boards that raises capital from the public financial markets; thus, the double 
sampling design is used to focus on the two water boards. The secondary data from the annual 
financial reports of Rand and Umngeni water boards is used in this study. 
 
The water boards that raise their funds from public capital markets post their annual financial 
statements (AFSs) for the past ten years on their websites. These annual financial statistics are the 
source of the data required for this study. The data is observed annually for a 10-year period. 
 
3.1.4 Descriptive statistics 
 
The Jarque–Bera test is used to test the data for normality. If the histogram of the residuals is bell 
shaped, then they are normally distributed (Brooks, 2014). This test is then measured against a 
significance level of 5%. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected if the normally distributed error is 
significant (above 5%); if not, it can be rejected. The Jarque–Bera test uses skewness and kurtosis 
to fully describe the data (Brooks, 2014). Skewness measures the extent to which the data are not 
symmetric to their mean. Kurtosis measures the fatness of the tails and the ways in which they 
peak at the mean. 
 
 
3.2 Regression Analysis 
 
The sampled data contains both time-series and cross-sectional elements; according to Brooks 
(2014), these data are known as  “panel of data”. These panel data apply to both of the analyzed 
pillars: macroeconomic conditions and time. The macroeconomic pillar is characterized by the 
leverage ratio (of the water boards) measured over time as the dependent variable and the 
macroeconomic conditions as the independent variables. The time pillar is characterized by the 
coverage ratio measured over time as the dependent variable and a macroeconomic variable 
(interest rate) and its lags as the independent variables. Both pillar investigations meet the criteria 
of panel data, as they contain time-series and cross-sectional components. However, the 
regression methodology for the time pillar is further discussed to enhance clarity. 
 
3.2.1 Time pillar regression analysis 
 
Based on the definition of Bernanke and Gertler (1995), the balance sheet channel explains the 
influence of monetary policy changes on income statements, balance sheets, net worth, cash 
flows and even liquid assets. In their study, Angelopoulou and Gibson (2009) use the monetary 
changes, measured as changes in interest rates over time, independently regressed against 
changes in investments and cash flows. Villegas Salazar (2009) use investments to investigate a 
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monetary shock in Colombia; alternatively, Shabbir (2012) uses financial expenses and monetary 
policy changes in his methodology. 
 
The methodology used for the time pillar is similar to the methodology used by Bernanke and 
Gertler (1995) in terms of variables. They use the coverage ratio (
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 
(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡)
) as the 
dependent variable regressed against changes in monetary policy represented by changes in the 
interest rate. Instead of using a variable influenced by the monetary changes as in the other study, 
they choose a ratio to represent the impact. This study adopts this approach rather than choosing 
just one or two influenced variables. They argue that the coverage ratio is highly correlated to 
other indicators of a company’s financial health. 
 
Bernanke and Gertler’s (1995) analysis is conducted over four lags. The lags in their study capture 
the delayed impacts of the interest rate changes on the coverage ratio. This delayed impact of the 
macroeconomic shock represents/reflects the evolution of capital structure. They use the vector 
autoregression (VAR) technique to regress the variables instead of panel techniques. 
 
3.2.2 Panel techniques 
 
Four main panel techniques are available: seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), fixed effects, 
pooled time-fixed effects and random effects models; however, these effects can be grouped as 
fixed, random and pooled effects (Brooks, 2014). Brooks (2014) indicates that the random effects 
model assumes the following: firstly, the intersection of each entity arises from the common 
intercept α, and the model is the same for all entities and over time; secondly, a random variable 
𝜖𝑖  varies cross-sectionally but is fixed over time. The intersection thus deviates from the global 
intersection term. Furthermore, this model is more appropriate for random samples; thus, it is 
not relevant in this study, because the sample is not random. 
 
The SUR requires that the number of time-series observations per cross-sectional area, at a 
minimum, as large as the cross-sectional units. This requirement is met by the observations in the 
data, but the disadvantage is the very high number of parameters. The pooled effects model is 
either fixed or random; it is used in the study to compare with the fixed effects to identify the 
most suitable model for the data. 
 
The fixed effects model fixes entities, which is applicable in this study. Furthermore, the model is 
more parsimonious than the SUR. However, it is said to be more appropriate when examining the 
entire population; otherwise, it is not relevant (Brooks, 2014). For this study, although the full 
water board population is not used, the full population of water boards that raise money from 
markets is used. The time fixed effects model fixes time as opposed to the entities, which makes 
it irrelevant in this study in which time is varied. Based on the fixed effects and pooled model, the 
regression model equations used in this study for the macroeconomic and time pillars are 
presented below. 
 
 
Pillar 1: Macroeconomic conditions: 
       𝐿𝑖𝑡  = ∝ +𝛽1𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 ………………     …….Eq. 1 
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Pillar 2: Time: 
 
 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃 + 𝛿1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑡−𝑗 +  𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 ……………    …….Eq. 2 
 
Table 3.1 describing the equation symbols 
 
Equation Symbols Description 
𝑳𝒊𝒕 Leverage ratio = 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
∝ Intercept of the macro-economic conditions 
pillar  
𝜷𝒊 Variable coefficient for the macro-economic 
conditions pillar, where 𝑖 varies from 1 to 3 
𝑮𝒕 Gross domestic product (GDP) varying with 
time 𝑡 
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒕 Inflation varying with time 𝑡 
𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒕 Interest rate varying with time 𝑡 
𝝁𝒊 All variables that affect 𝐿𝑖𝑡 cross-sectionally but 
are not time variable 
𝒗𝒊𝒕 Remainder of the disturbance per entity 𝑖 and 
varying with time 𝑡 
𝑪𝑹𝒊𝒕 Coverage ratio = 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 
(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠+𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡)
 
𝜽 Intercept of the macroeconomic pillar  
𝜹𝒊 Variable coefficient for the macroeconomic 
pillar, where 𝑖 varies from 1 to 3 
𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒕 Interest rate varying with time 𝑡 
𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒕−𝒋 Interest rate varying with time 𝑡 lagged by time 
period j, where j ranges from 1 to 4 
 𝜺𝒊 Cross-sectional error term per entity 𝑖 
𝜸𝒊𝒕 Error term per entity 𝑖 and varying with time 𝑡 
 
 
Pillar 1 seeks to answer the first question of the study: Does the capital structure for natural 
monopolies (parastatals) dynamically respond to macroeconomic conditions? As a result capital 
structure represented by leverage is regressed against macroeconomic conditions. The results 
advise if there is a relationship and its associated strength. Pillar 2 seeks to answer if the balance 
sheet channel theory holds for natural monopolies (parastatals), or do macroeconomic shocks 
have an impact on capital structure over time? To achieve this changes of the interest Coverage 
ratio representing company characteristics is regressed against changes in interest rate. The same 
regression has been used by other studies to test the existence of the balance sheet channel 
theory. 
The use of panel techniques is common for pillar 1 studies, as demonstrated in the work of 
Korajczy and Levy (2003), due to the cross-sectional nature of the data. However, in their study, 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) use VAR models. For this study panel techniques are used to analyze 
both pillars, as the data meet the panel data criteria defined by Brooks (2014). The variables 
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chosen as the independent variables are identified from previous studies of this nature. Previous 
capital structure studies have used the following macroeconomic conditions: 
 GDP (Kayo & Kimura, 2011; Bokpin, 2009; Axelson et al., 2013; Frank & Goyal, 2009) 
 Interest rate (Axelson et al., 2013) 
 Inflation (Bokpin, 2009; Frank & Goyal, 2009) 
 Taxation (Frank & Goyal, 2009; Delcoure, 2007) 
All these have been used in this study except for the taxation as the sample exists under the same 
tax laws. All these are relevant for the Pillar 1 regression. As per section 3.2.1 the choice of the 
independent variables are based on the work by Bernanke and Gertler (1995). 
 
 
3.2.2.1 Interpretation of panel techniques 
 
The original data trends are the first analyzed and interpreted to identify outliers and trends within 
the data. Thereafter, the regression results are interpreted and analyzed based on theoretical 
expectations presented in chapter 2. Basic theoretical interpretations are then used to provide 
indicators of the signs of the coefficients, and such indicators are also analyzed and interpreted. 
The R-squared is used to explain the influence of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable. 
Information criteria are used to select between the competing models in this study, i.e., the fixed 
and pooled model options. A number of these methods can be used to select between these 
models, including adjusted R-SQUARED, the Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz's Bayesian 
information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan–Quinn information criterion (HQIC) (Brooks, 2014). 
The most common criteria used in similar studies are the AIC and the SBIC (Frank & Goyal, 2009; 
Kayo & Kimura, 2011). The three information criteria considered here have different levels of 
stiffness in their penalty term, with the SBIC being the stiffest, followed by the HQIC and then the 
AIC. The SBIC is very consistent but inefficient, while the AIC is more efficient but inconsistent. 
Brooks (2014) indicates that “SBIC will asymptotically deliver the correct model order”. 
 
3.2.2.2 Reliability of the results 
 
Two critical tests are conducted to ensure that the results are not spurious: the unit root test and 
the cointegration test. The panel unit root test is conducted to determine whether the data are 
stationary. According to Ramirez (2006), they are more powerful and less likely to commit type II 
errors, and they lead to “statistics with a normal distribution in the limit”.  Stationarity can strongly 
influence the behavior and the properties of a series. When the series is not stationary, the 
impacts of shocks can last beyond the shock period and can even increase, thus altering the 
properties of that series (Brooks, 2014). The panel unit root test used for this study is the Levin, 
Lin and Chu test. 
The Pedroni residual cointegration test, which is frequently used in panel studies, including that 
of Ramirez (2006), is used to test cointegration. To interpret the results, the probability is 
compared to the significance level. If the probability is higher than the significance level of 10%, 
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the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected. If the probability is lower than 10%, 
the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
 
 
  
28 
 
CHAPTER 4: Results and Discussion 
 
The results from the data analysis are presented and discussed in this chapter, starting with the data 
modification performed. The descriptive statistics are then presented for all the independent variables 
across the two regressions. The descriptive statistics for the dependent variable are then presented 
before the regression results for both pillars. Pillar one presents the regression results for the leverage 
analyzed against three macroeconomic conditions, namely, GDP, changes in interest rate and 
inflation. Pillar two is the coverage ratio analyzed against the changes in interest rate and its three 
lags. 
 
4.1 Data modification 
Macroeconomic data from the period of interest are downloaded from the World Bank database into 
an Excel spreadsheet. The data was collected annually in line with the source of time regression data. 
The time regression data is sourced from the AFSs of the study samples. Leverage is calculated as 
=
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 
, while the Coverage ratio is calculated as =
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 
(𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠+𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡)
. 
 
AFSs are available for all years in the study period, except for 2008 for sample 2 (Umngeni Water Board 
data). A dummy variable is then used for the leverage and Coverage ratio, derived from the fiscal years 
of 2007 and 2009 based on the gradient of the data over time. The formula used to estimate the 
dummy variables is 𝐹2007 − (
𝐹2007− 𝐹2009 
2 
), where F is the leverage ratio or the Coverage ratio. The two 
data sets (from each water board) are then combined and arranged for a panel analysis. The data are 
then uploaded to EViews for analysis. 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics (independent variables) 
The probability of the Jarque–Bera test for GDP is found to be significant (at the 5% significance level) 
with a probability of 75% (see Figure 4.2.1). As a result, the null hypothesis for residual normality 
cannot be rejected for the GDP series. The third and fourth moments (skewness and kurtosis) are 
found to be -0.41 and 3.1, respectively. A normal distribution has a kurtosis coefficient of 3 and a 
skewness coefficient of 0. The GDP series is found to have kurtosis and skewness coefficients close to 
those of the normally distributed series, as would be expected for a significant probability. 
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Figure 4.2.1 Jarque–Bera normality test results for GDP 
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GDP data is found to have a negative GDP of -0.015 in the year 2009, representing an outlier in the 
data. This negative growth is a result of the 2009 recession. Appendix C contains the panel data series 
for all the macro-economic variables over time and GDP is represented by figure C1. This repeats the 
GDP series over the ten-year period for both sample 1 (Rand Water) and sample 2 (Umngeni Water). 
The recession point can be clearly observed in this time series. The Levin, Lin and Chu unit root test 
results indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root test can be rejected for the GDP series at a 
significance level of 10% per Appendix B (Table B1: Unit root results for GDP) 
For the interest rate the probability of the Jarque–Bera test is found to be significant (0.75), indicating 
that the null hypothesis for a normal distribution also cannot be rejected (see Figure 4.2.2). The 
Jarque–Bera statistic is found to be 0.6 (rather than zero) due to a skewness of 0.12 (rather than 0) 
and a kurtosis of 2.2 (rather than 3). However, the results of the Levin, Lin and Chu unit root test show 
a significant probability, indicating that the null hypothesis for a unit root cannot be rejected 
(Appendix B: Table B2: Unit root results for interest rate).  
This finding poses a problem if the data is used under the current conditions, as the results may be 
spurious. To improve the statistical quality of the interest rate data, it is differentiated. The differential 
interest rate is then used in the regression, representing the changes in interest rates over time. 
Appendix C contains the panel data series for the changes of the interest rate over time represented 
by Figure C2. The interest rate changes are aligned with known events such as the 2009 recession, 
resulting in a reduced interest rate to stimulate the economy. The GDP increase in 2010 is aligned with 
the tourism contribution due to the FIFA World Cup held in SA that year. 
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Figure 4.2.2 Jarque–Bera normality test results for the interest rate 
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The probability of the Jarque–Bera test is found to be insignificant for inflation as per Figure 4.2.3. 
Thus, the null hypothesis of a normal distribution can be rejected. The unit root test probability is also 
found to be insignificant; thus, the null hypothesis for a unit root can be rejected (Appendix B: Table 
B3: Unit root results for inflation). 
Figure 4.2.3 Jarque–Bera normality test results for inflation 
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The inflation time series (as per appendix C, figure C3) does not present any outliers that cannot be 
explained. The 2009 recession also results in an inflation spike. Similarly, due to a panel analysis, the 
inflation data are repeated over the two sample analysis periods. For two of the independent variables 
(GDP and inflation), the null hypothesis for a unit root can be rejected. As indicated the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected for the interest rate variable, the series is differentiated to improve the data 
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quality. These results and the differentiated interest rate confirm that the data can the used in a 
regressions.  
4.3 Pillar one: Results for the macro-economic conditions regression 
 
The probability of the Jarque–Bera test is found to be significant (0.051) for leverage, indicating that 
the null hypothesis for a normal distribution cannot be rejected, as shown in Figure 4.3.1. The results 
of the Levin, Lin and Chu unit root test show an insignificant probability, indicating that the null 
hypothesis for a unit root can be rejected (as shown in appendix B, Table B4). Figure 4.3.2 presents 
data on the two samples over time, and sample 2 continuously decreases from a high position of 
leverage over time. This corporate strategy is clearly associated with gearing in the earlier stages of 
the period and then paying off the debt over time, irrespective of the macroeconomic conditions. This 
finding is aligned with those of DeAngelo et al. (2011), who find that companies sometimes deviate to 
address investment needs that might not be within the ideal balance. However, sample 1 shows a 
reaction trend based on the macroeconomic conditions. 
Figure 4.3.1 Jarque–Bera normality test for leverage
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Figure 4.3.2 Leverage change series over time for both water boards
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The panel least squares model is used for the regression, with fixed or pooled cross-section options. 
The information criteria used in previous similar studies are used to choose the best model. The ideal 
model is chosen based on low values for information criteria, especially the AIC and SBIC. Table 4.3.1 
shows the results of this comparison, which reveal that the fixed option is superior. 
 
Table. 4.3.1 Information criterion results indicating that the fixed model is superior 
 
 
 
 
The results of this model are then used to define the relationships between the dependent variable 
and the independent variables. The R-squared is found to be 59.2%, implying that only 59.2% of the 
dependent variable’s variation can be explained by the independent variables. Thus, other factors that 
are not considered in this study are at play. The signs of the coefficients are found to be aligned with 
theory, as the leverage is expected to increase as the interest rate decreases. 
 
 𝐿𝑖𝑡  =  0.0061 + 1.4474 𝐺𝑡 + 3.0305 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑡 − 1.9939 𝜕𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  …  ……….Eq. 3 
Std. error 0.1090 1.7750 1.5622  2.3050 
t-Statistic 0.0556 0.8155 1.9400 -0.8650 
Prob. 0.9565 0.4295 0.0744  0.4027 
 
The Pedroni residual cointegration test is conducted to test the model for cointegration. The null 
hypothesis for the test is that no cointegration exists, and 11 methods are used to generate the results. 
All 11 methods are found to be significant at the 10% level, implying that the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected. Since one of the five assumptions of ordinary least squares (OLS) is that the residuals are 
Fixed 
 Akaike information criterion -0.985938 
 Schwarz criterion -0.738613 
Pooled 
 Akaike information criterion -0.313383 
 Schwarz criterion -0.115522 
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normally distributed, the Jarque–Bera normality test is performed on the residuals, and the probability 
is significant, implying that the null hypothesis of normal distribution cannot be rejected. 
Table. 4.3.2 Pedroni residual cointegration test results 
Indicating that the null of no cointegration cannot be rejected 
 
    Weighted  
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic -0.461862  0.6779 -0.319435  0.6253 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.753911  0.7745  0.809696  0.7909 
Panel PP-Statistic -0.333369  0.3694 -0.055121  0.4780 
Panel ADF-Statistic  1.421246  0.9224  1.741191  0.9592 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  1.532871  0.9373   
Group PP-Statistic  0.441040  0.6704   
Group ADF-Statistic  2.713193  0.9967   
      
      
 
Figure 4.3.3 Jarque–Bera normality test for the leverage residuals 
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The findings of this study agree with those of Bokpin (2009), who document a relationship between 
macroeconomic conditions and capital structure. Although the variables are only able to explain 59% 
of the dependent variable in this case, the GDP and interest rate are significant. The insignificance of 
inflation is in line with the findings of Frank and Goyal (2009), as inflation does not demonstrate a 
reliable relationship with capital structure. The negative sign of the interest rate is also aligned with 
the findings of other theoretical studies, including that of Korajczy and Levy (2003). They argue that 
optimal capital structure is counter-cyclical for financially unconstrained firms and the findings in this 
study are aligned with these notions. 
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The other factors that might help explain the dependent variable may be aligned with theories that 
are not investigated in this study, such as modern theories (Harris & Raviv, 1991) rather than tax-based 
theories (Korajczyk & Levy, 2003 and  Booth et al., 2001). As previously mentioned, the modern theory 
primarily relates to four models based on 1) agency costs, 2) asymmetric information, 3) behavior in 
the product or input market, and 4) corporate control considerations (Harris & Raviv, 1991). Given the 
product that water boards sell (i.e., water), the behavior-in-the-product-or-input-market model may 
explain the high gearing observed in sample 2 and its decrease over time. 
The behavior-in-the-product-or-input-market model is characterized by two strategic variables, 
namely, price and quantity (Harris & Raviv, 1991). In SA, parliament approves the prices, but the users 
determine the quantity. Thus, if demand increases, water boards must fund new infrastructure 
projects to respond to the quantity demanded by users. This finding is aligned with the theoretical 
findings of DeAngelo et al. (2011). 
 
4.4 Pillar two: Results for the time regression 
The probability of the Jarque–Bera test is found to be insignificant (0.020) for the Coverage ratio, 
indicating that the null hypothesis for a normal distribution can be rejected (see Figure 4.4.1). The 
Levin, Lin and Chu unit root test results show an insignificant probability, indicating that the null 
hypothesis for a unit root can be rejected (see Table 4.4.1). Figure 4.4.2 demonstrates the two 
samples’ Coverage ratios over time. A leverage corporate strategy is also observed in this series for 
sample 2. The Coverage ratio for sample two is continuously decreasing from a high position over 
time. A delayed reaction trend in the Coverage ratio seemingly occurs due to interest rate changes. 
The observation further justifies the use of lags in the regression. 
Figure 4.4.1 Jarque–Bera normality test for Coverage ratio 
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Table 4.4.1 Unit root test results for leverage 
        
        
Method   Statistic  Prob.**  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  -1.75131   0.0399  
        
        
 
Figure 4.4.2 Coverage ratio series over time for both water boards and interest rates 
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The panel least squares model is used for the regression with fixed or pooled cross-sectional options. 
Lags are progressively tested from the first lag one to the third lag. The third lag gave the highest R-
squared among other results. The fixed or pooled models were then compared at this lag to choose 
the best model. The best model was chosen using the information criterion used in previous similar 
studies. The idea model was chosen based on low information criterion figures, especially from the 
AIC and the SBIC. Table 4.4.2 presents the results of this comparison. The information criterion results 
demonstrate that the fixed option is superior to the pooled model at the third lag. 
 
 
Table. 4.4.2 Information criterion results indicating that the fixed model is superior 
Fixed 
 Akaike information criterion -4.079858 
 Schwarz criterion -3.837405 
 
 
 
The results of this model are then used to define the relationship between the dependent variable 
and the independent variables. The R-squared is found to be 96.4%, implying that 96.4% of the 
Pooled 
 Akaike information criterion -2.808616 
 Schwarz criterion -2.606571 
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dependent variable’s variation can be explained by the independent variable and its lags. The signs of 
the coefficients are found to be aligned with theoretical assumptions. 
 
 
 
 𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  0.0563 − 6.4160 𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 0.3923𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑡−1 − 0.9212 𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑡−2 + 2.155 𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑡−3  + 𝜀𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 
            Eq 4 
Std. error 0.0146 0.9964 1.4105  2.3050 0.8179 
t-Statistic 3.863 -6.4392 0.2782 -0.8650 2.6353 
Prob. 0.0083 0.0007 0.7902  0.4027 0.0388 
 
The Pedroni residual cointegration test is conducted to test the model for cointegration. The null 
hypothesis for the test is that no cointegration exists, and 11 methods are used to generate the results. 
All 11 methods are found to be significant at the 10% level, implying that the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected. The Jarque–Bera normality test is used to test the normality of the Coverage ratio 
residuals, and the null for normality cannot be rejected. 
 
Table. 4.4.3 Pedroni residual cointegration test results 
Indicating that the null of no cointegration cannot be rejected 
      
      
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic -0.576112  0.7177 -0.632648  0.7365 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.024836  0.8473  0.972729  0.8347 
Panel PP-Statistic  1.170652  0.8791  1.015598  0.8451 
Panel ADF-Statistic  1.856722  0.9683  1.056897  0.8547 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  1.626841  0.9481   
Group PP-Statistic  1.746365  0.9596   
Group ADF-Statistic  2.059837  0.9803   
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Figure 4.4.3 Jarque–Bera normality test for the Coverage ratio residuals 
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As stated earlier, the balance sheet channel seeks to explain the influence of macroeconomic 
conditions (through monetary policy) on income statements, balance sheets, net worth, cash flows 
and even liquid assets (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995). This study uses changes in the real interest rate to 
represent monetary policy. The changes in the income statement are investigated through the 
coverage ratio. The changes in the interest rate and its lags are able to explain 96.4% of the coverage 
ratio, which supports the balance sheet channel theory in the bulk water industry for water boards 
that access capital from the markets. 
The current change in the real interest rate is not significant; its first and second lags are found to be 
significant. Therefore, the impact of the interest rate change is delayed. These findings are aligned 
with the empirical findings of Villegas Salazar (2009), who validates the balance sheet channel theory 
in non-financial institutions in Colombia. Using data on Pakistan, Shabbir (2012) documents similar 
results as those documented by Villegas Salazar (2009). According to Shabbir, “the monetary 
contraction increases the financial expenses of the firms, reduces their profits and squeezes their cash 
flow”. This finding is also aligned with the relationship noted between the Coverage ratio and the 
change in the interest rate in the current study. 
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusions and the proposed optimized capital structure 
framework for natural monopolies in the bulk water industry 
 
This study investigates the answers to two questions in order to create a capital structure framework 
for natural monopolies within the bulk water industry. The two questions are as follows: 
 Does capital structure for natural monopolies (parastatals) dynamically respond to 
macroeconomic conditions?  
 Does the balance sheet channel theory hold for natural monopolies (parastatals)? 
The investigation takes a two pillar approach. On the one hand, the regressions for the microeconomic 
conditions pillar aim to investigate whether the capital structure dynamically responds to the 
macroeconomic conditions. On the other hand, the regressions for the time pillar aims to determine 
whether the balance sheet channel holds for natural monopolies. For both pillars, a literature review 
has been conducted to assess the current knowledge on the subject matter, including capital structure 
behavior due to macroeconomic conditions and relevant theories, the variables found to be more 
theoretically relevant, and the methodology used to conduct previous empirical studies. 
The empirical investigation for both pillars has been conducted with data from the Annual Financial 
Statements of the relevant water boards and macroeconomic data from the World Bank. The data is 
analyzed in EViews, first testing for the existence of a unit root and normality. After the regression is 
conducted, it is tested for cointegration. These tests are conducted to ensure that the results and 
subsequent inferences are not spurious. Some variables are differentiated to improve the statistical 
quality for the analysis. The macroeconomic variables used in the study are GDP, the interest rate and 
inflation—in line with previous empirical studies conducted by authors such as Kayo and Kimura 
(2011), Bokpin (2009), Axelson et al. (2013), and Frank and Goyal (2009). The variables for the 
macroeconomic conditions are regressed as independent variables for both pillars. For the two 
regressions conducted, the dependent variables are leverage and the coverage ratio. 
The Jarque–Bera normality test is used to investigate normality of all the variables. According to its 
null hypothesis, the series are normal; thus, if the probability is significant, the null cannot be rejected 
at a significance level of 5%. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected for any variables, except for the 
inflation and the Coverage ratio. The normality of the variables is not assumed under OLS, but the 
normality of the error is assumed under OLS (Brooks, 2014). The Jarque–Bera normality test is 
performed on the residuals, and the null hypothesis for normal distribution cannot be rejected for 
either regression. The Levin, Lin and Chu unit root test is conducted to investigate the existence of a 
unit root at a significance level of 10%, and all series, except for the interest rate, are found not to 
have a unit root except. The interest rate is not directly used in the regression; it is differentiated to 
improve the statistical quality, and its change over time is used in the regression. 
 
5.1 Does the capital structure for natural monopolies (parastatals) dynamically respond to 
macroeconomic conditions? 
 
This question is answered in the macroeconomic pillar; all the macroeconomic variables are regressed 
against leverage. The findings of this study agree with those of Bokpin (2009), who document a 
relationship between the macroeconomic condition variable and capital structure. Although the 
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variables are only able to explain 59% of the dependent variable in this case, the GDP and the interest 
rate are significant. The insignificance of inflation is aligned with the findings of Frank and Goyal 
(2009), who show that inflation does not have a reliable relationship with capital structure. Therefore, 
the answer is yes—leverage does partly dynamically respond to macroeconomic conditions in water 
boards in SA. 
5.1.1 Macroeconomic framework 
In their study, Hackbarth et al. (2006) have indicated that firms benefit from linking their financial 
policies to the position of the economy in the business cycle. The results of this empirical study is in 
support of their findings. The water boards in SA that raise their capital in the open market should 
align their policies to the economic business cycle. 
 
5.2 Does the balance sheet channel theory hold for natural monopolies (parastatals)? 
This question is answered by the time pillar, whereby the change in the interest rate over time and its 
lags are regressed as independent variables with the Coverage ratio as the dependent variable. This 
result is then used to determine the influence of the macroeconomic conditions (through monetary 
policy) on income statements, balance sheets, net worth, cash flows and even liquid assets 
(represented by the Coverage ratio). This approach is aligned with those of other studies and their 
conceptualizations of the balance sheet channel theory (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995). This study uses 
the changes in the real interest rate over time to represent monetary policy. The changes in the 
interest rate and its lags are able to explain 96.4% of the Coverage ratio. Thus, the balance sheet 
channel theory holds for water boards that access capital from the markets. 
5.2.1 Macroeconomic conditions framework 
The benefit of linking policies to the business cycle holds for this pillar as well. The critical observation 
from this empirical exercise is the significance of the delayed impact of the interest rate changes. This 
significance is observed on the first and second lags of the interest rate changes. Thus, the water 
boards’ policies should incorporate a two-year interest rate impact delay into their financial planning. 
5.3 Research limitations 
The study has been conducted on two of the nine water boards—a subsample focusing on water 
boards that obtain capital from the open financial markets only. Thus, the findings of this study do not 
apply to other water boards and cannot be generalized. The study specifically focuses on one industry 
and thus cannot be generalized to other industries. 
 
5.4 Recommendations for future studies 
As indicated firm characteristics are not  investigated in this study however their critical role in 
the optimal capital structure cannot be ignored; as they are primarily driven by the firm’s assets 
(Axelson et al., 2013). These assets can range from the firm’s cash flows (stable or instable), 
profitability, governance structure, and mix of tangible and intangible assets, among others. The 
dynamic nature of the firms’ characteristics thus influences the ideal optimal capital structure as 
well. This influence is recommended for future studies.  
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Captured data, leverage and Coverage ratio information for the panel 
analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Time  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
RAND WATER 
Revenue 
ZAR 
3,667,557,000.0
0 
ZAR 
4,101,080,000.0
0 
ZAR 
4,258,538,000.0
0 
ZAR 
4,632,484,000.0
0 
ZAR 
4,966,187,000.0
0 
ZAR 
5,887,992,000.0
0 
ZAR 
6,838,493,000.00 
ZAR 
7,751,214,000.00 
ZAR 
8,664,894,000.00 
ZAR 
9,802,542,000.00 
Expenses 
ZAR 
2,991,493,000.0
0 
ZAR 
3,353,109,000.0
0 
ZAR 
3,463,818,000.0
0 
ZAR 
4,114,314,000.0
0 
ZAR 
4,641,269,000.0
0 
ZAR 
5,314,815,000.0
0 
ZAR 
6,108,933,000.00 
ZAR 
6,799,723,000.00 
ZAR 
7,551,327,000.00 
ZAR 
8,444,942,000.00 
Operationa
l profit 
ZAR 
676,064,000.00 
ZAR 
747,971,000.00 
ZAR 
794,720,000.00 
ZAR 
518,170,000.00 
ZAR 
324,918,000.00 
ZAR 
573,177,000.00 
ZAR 
729,560,000.00 
ZAR 
951,491,000.00 
ZAR 
1,113,567,000.00 
ZAR 
1,357,600,000.00 
Interest 
expenses 
ZAR 
129,999,000.00 
ZAR 
74,580,000.00 
ZAR 
97,599,000.00 
ZAR 
95,795,000.00 
ZAR 
101,799,000.00 
ZAR 
78,788,000.00 ZAR 4,338,000.00 ZAR 3,237,000.00 ZAR 4,543,000.00 ZAR 387,000.00 
Net profit 
ZAR 
586,260,000.00 
ZAR 
742,078,000.00 
ZAR 
823,817,000.00 
ZAR 
598,579,000.00 
ZAR 
312,438,000.00 
ZAR 
553,891,000.00 
ZAR 
771,506,000.00 
ZAR 
974,845,000.00 
ZAR 
1,182,667,000.00 
ZAR 
1,441,044,000.00 
 Coverage 
ratio 0.181497196 0.091323418 0.10592284 0.137958795 0.245750621 0.124530765 0.00559133 0.003309538 0.003826619 0.000268483 
Current 
interest-
bearing 
borrowing 
ZAR 
13,087,000.00 
ZAR 
9,499,000.00 ZAR 358,000.00 ZAR 100,000.00 ZAR 0.00 ZAR 0.00 ZAR 208,228.00 ZAR 1,818,000.00 ZAR 2,458,000.00 ZAR 2,469,000.00 
Non-
current 
interest-
bearing 
borrowing 
ZAR 
735,175,000.00 
ZAR 
725,736,000.00 
ZAR 
726,998,000.00 
ZAR 
628,252,000.00 
ZAR 
629,665,000.00 
ZAR 
645,517,000.00 
ZAR 
984,636,000.00 
ZAR 
1,514,586,000.00 
ZAR 
2,510,093,000.00 
ZAR 
3,672,432,000.00 
Total debt 
ZAR 
748,262,000.00 
ZAR 
735,235,000.00 
ZAR 
727,356,000.00 
ZAR 
628,352,000.00 
ZAR 
629,665,000.00 
ZAR 
645,517,000.00 
ZAR 
984,844,228.00 
ZAR 
1,516,404,000.00 
ZAR 
2,512,551,000.00 
ZAR 
3,674,901,000.00 
Total 
assets  
ZAR 
5,389,055,000.0
0 
ZAR 
6,253,635,000.0
0 
ZAR 
7,012,667,000.0
0 
ZAR 
7,911,184,000.0
0 
ZAR 
8,462,459,000.0
0 
ZAR 
9,120,138,000.0
0 
ZAR 
10,992,797,000.0
0 
ZAR 
12,630,891,000.0
0 
ZAR 
15,321,711,000.0
0 
ZAR 
18,373,466,000.0
0 
Leverage  0.138848462 0.117569222 0.103720311 0.079425785 0.07440686 0.070779302 0.089589959 0.120055189 0.16398632 0.20001131 
UMNGENI WATER 
Revenue 
ZAR 
1,076,703,000.0
0 
ZAR 
1,180,260,000.0
0   
ZAR 
1,485,496,000.0
0 
ZAR 
1,622,380,000.0
0 
ZAR 
1,648,950,000.0
0 
ZAR 
1,835,075,000.00 
ZAR 
1,895,887,000.00 
ZAR 
2,187,886,000.00 
ZAR 
2,207,704,000.00 
Expenses 
ZAR 
639,040,000.00 
ZAR 
709,705,000.00  
ZAR 
843,362,000.00 
ZAR 
1,002,280,000.0
0 
ZAR 
1,203,892,000.0
0 
ZAR 
1,259,772,000.00 
ZAR 
1,298,971,000.00 
ZAR 
1,590,965,000.00 
ZAR 
1,540,061,000.00 
Operationa
l profit 
ZAR 
437,663,000.00 
ZAR 
470,555,000.00   
ZAR 
642,134,000.00 
ZAR 
620,100,000.00 
ZAR 
445,058,000.00 
ZAR 
575,303,000.00 
ZAR 
596,916,000.00 
ZAR 
596,921,000.00 
ZAR 
667,643,000.00 
Interest 
expenses 
ZAR 
473,895,000.00 
ZAR 
309,417,000.00   
ZAR 
267,571,000.00 
ZAR 
230,499,000.00 
ZAR 
114,237,000.00 
ZAR 
84,567,000.00 
ZAR 
66,477,000.00 
ZAR 
45,510,000.00 ZAR 2,672,000.00 
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Net profit 
ZAR 
154,077,000.00 
ZAR 
250,752,000.00   
ZAR 
525,638,000.00 
ZAR 
540,024,000.00 
ZAR 
425,052,000.00 
ZAR 
590,815,000.00 
ZAR 
664,468,000.00 
ZAR 
673,969,000.00 
ZAR 
800,929,000.00 
 Coverage 
ratio 0.754643519 ZAR 0.55 Not Available 0.337327237 0.299146164 ZAR 0.21 0.125213583 0.090946651 0.063254105 0.003325033 
Current 
interest-
bearing 
borrowing 
ZAR 
116,190,000.00 
ZAR 
120,268,000.00   
ZAR 
1,061,455,000.0
0 
ZAR 
117,282,000.00 
ZAR 
115,006,000.00 
ZAR 
12,831,000.00 
ZAR 
109,451,000.00 
ZAR 
78,263,000.00 
ZAR 
78,433,000.00 
Non-
current 
interest-
bearing 
borrowing 
ZAR 
2,168,572,000.0
0 
ZAR 
2,060,323,000.0
0   
ZAR 
917,448,000.00 
ZAR 
1,400,166,000.0
0 
ZAR 
1,257,787,000.0
0 
ZAR 
1,136,306,000.00 
ZAR 
1,025,930,000.00 
ZAR 
1,171,766,000.00 
ZAR 
1,093,331,000.00 
Total debt 
ZAR 
2,284,762,000.0
0 
ZAR 
2,180,591,000.0
0  
ZAR 
1,978,903,000.0
0 
ZAR 
1,517,448,000.0
0 
ZAR 
1,372,793,000.0
0 
ZAR 
1,149,137,000.00 
ZAR 
1,135,381,000.00 
ZAR 
1,250,029,000.00 
ZAR 
1,093,331,000.00 
Total 
assets  
ZAR 
2,991,292,000.0
0 
ZAR 
3,230,495,000.0
0   
ZAR 
4,073,721,000.0
0 
ZAR 
4,297,404,000.0
0 
ZAR 
4,770,642,000.0
0 
ZAR 
5,173,778,000.00 
ZAR 
5,893,407,000.00 
ZAR 
6,790,319,000.00 
ZAR 
7,598,673,000.00 
Leverage  0.763804403 0.675002128 Not Available 0.485772835 0.353108062 0.287758545 0.222107906 0.192652739 0.184089879 0.143884465 
GDP 
growth 
(annual %) 5.585045962 5.360474053 3.191043888 -1.538089135 3.039734625 3.284197135 2.213258978 2.330342259 1.628871543 1.264651378 
Inflation, 
consumer 
prices 
(annual %) 4.641624894 7.098419808 11.53645077 7.13 4.26234355 4.995510185 5.653583003 5.445279482 6.375259009 4.588271042 
Real 
interest 
rate (%) 4.603671469 3.966380361 5.78272573 3.910367979 3.274351919 2.316472195 3.289403088 1.794189268 3.239059816 5.251954785 
 
 
 
  
Appendix B 
Detailed unit root results 
 
Table B1: Unit root results for GDP 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (common unit root process)   
Series: GDP       
Date: 01/20/17 Time: 00:10     
Sample: 2006–2015      
Exogenous variables: Individual effects    
User-specified lags: 1      
Newey–West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel  
Total (balanced) observations: 16     
Cross-sections included: 2     
        
        Method   Statistic  Prob.**  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  
-
4.80117   0.0000  
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asymptotic normality  
        
Intermediate results for GDP     
        
        Cross- 2nd-Stage Variance HAC of   Max Band-  
section Coefficient of Reg. Dep. Lag Lag width Obs. 
 1 -1.29252  0.0002  9.E-05  1  1  8.0  8 
 2 -1.29252  0.0002  9.E-05  1  1  8.0  8 
        
 Coefficient t-Stat SE Reg. mu* sig*  Obs. 
Pooled -1.29252 -5.783  1.000 -0.554  0.919   16 
        
        
 
 
Table B2: Unit root results for interest rate 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (common unit root process)   
Series: INTEREST_RATE      
Date: 01/20/17 Time: 00:27     
Sample: 2006–2015      
Exogenous variables: Individual effects    
User-specified lags: 1      
Newey–West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel  
Total (balanced) observations: 16     
Cross-sections included: 2     
        
        Method   Statistic  Prob.**  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  
 0.6288
0   0.7353  
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asymptotic normality  
        
Intermediate results for INTEREST_RATE    
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Cross- 2nd-Stage Variance HAC of   Max Band-  
section Coefficient of Reg. Dep. Lag Lag width Obs. 
 1 -0.74023  0.0002  0.0001  1  1  1.0  8 
 2 -0.74023  0.0002  0.0001  1  1  1.0  8 
        
 Coefficient t-Stat SE Reg. mu* sig*  Obs. 
Pooled -0.74023 -2.285  1.000 -0.554  0.919   16 
        
        
 
Table B3: Unit root results for inflation 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (common unit root process)   
Series: INFLATION      
Date: 01/20/17 Time: 21:26     
Sample: 2006 2015      
Exogenous variables: Individual effects    
User-specified lags: 1      
Newey–West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel  
Total (balanced) observations: 16     
Cross-sections included: 2     
        
        Method   Statistic  Prob.**  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  
-
2.70684   0.0034  
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asymptotic normality  
        
Intermediate results on INFLATION     
        
        Cross- 2nd-Stage Variance HAC of   Max Band-  
section Coefficient of Reg. Dep. Lag Lag width Obs. 
 1 -1.07602  0.0003  0.0002  1  1  8.0  8 
 2 -1.07602  0.0003  0.0002  1  1  8.0  8 
        
 Coefficient t-Stat SE Reg. mu* sig*  Obs. 
Pooled -1.07602 -4.144  1.000 -0.554  0.919   16 
        
        
 
 
Table B4: Unit root results for leverage 
 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (common unit root process)   
Series: LEVERAGE      
Date: 01/20/17 Time: 22:28     
Sample: 2006–2015      
Exogenous variables: Individual effects    
User-specified lags: 1      
Newey–West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel  
Total (balanced) observations: 16     
Cross-sections included: 2     
        
        Method   Statistic  Prob.**  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  
-
1.89061   0.0293  
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asymptotic normality  
        
Intermediate results for LEVERAGE     
        
        Cross- 2nd-Stage Variance HAC of   Max Band-  
48 
 
section Coefficient of Reg. Dep. Lag Lag width Obs. 
 1 -0.27601  8.E-05  0.0013  1  1  2.0  8 
 2 -0.14954  0.0005  0.0026  1  1  2.0  8 
        
 Coefficient t-Stat SE Reg. mu* sig*  Obs. 
Pooled -0.16627 -3.168  1.021 -0.554  0.919   16 
        
     
 
   
 
 
 
 
Table B4: Unit root results for Coverage ratio 
 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (common unit root process)   
Series: COVERAGE_RATIO      
Appendix A Date: 01/21/17 Time: 00:49     
Sample: 2006–2015      
Exogenous variables: Individual effects    
User-specified lags: 1      
Newey–West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel  
Total (balanced) observations: 16     
Cross-sections included: 2     
        
        Method   Statistic  Prob.**  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  
-
1.75131   0.0399  
        
        ** Probabilities are computed assuming asymptotic normality  
        
Intermediate results for COVERAGE_RATIO    
        
        Cross- 2nd-Stage Variance HAC of   Max Band-  
section Coefficient of Reg. Dep. Lag Lag width Obs. 
 1 -0.48596  0.0040  0.0008  1  1  8.0  8 
 2 -0.19104  0.0004  0.0033  1  1  1.0  8 
        
 Coefficient t-Stat SE Reg. mu* sig*  Obs. 
Pooled -0.20659 -2.684  1.024 -0.554  0.919   16 
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Appendix C 
Time series for macro-economic variable 
 
 
 
Figure C1 GDP series over time 
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Figure C2 Interest rate changes over time for both water boards 
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Figure C3 Inflation change series over time for both water boards 
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Appendix D 
 
Regression results 
 
 
Macroeconomic conditions regression 
Regression results for panel options with a fixed cross-section 
 
Dependent Variable: LEVERAGE   
Method: Panel least squares   
Date: 01/20/17 Time: 00:39   
Sample (adjusted): 2007–2015   
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 2   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 18  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
     
     C 0.006050 0.108888 0.055560 0.9565 
DINTEREST_RATE2 -1.993846 2.304913 -0.865042 0.4027 
GDP 1.447386 1.774847 0.815499 0.4295 
INFLATION 3.030464 1.562195 1.939876 0.0744 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.592466  Mean dependent variable 0.230239 
Adjusted R-squared 0.467071  S.D. dependent variable 0.180452 
S.E. of regression 0.131734  Akaike information criterion -0.985938 
Sum squared residuals 0.225598  Schwarz criterion -0.738613 
Log likelihood 13.87345  Hannan–Quinn criterion -0.951835 
F-statistic 4.724799  Durbin–Watson stat 0.416689 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.014187    
 
 
Regression results for panel options with a pooled cross-section 
 
Dependent Variable: LEVERAGE   
Method: Panel least squares   
Date: 01/15/17 Time: 01:46   
Sample (adjusted): 2007–2015   
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 2   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 18  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
     
     C 0.006790 0.287960 0.023580 0.9815 
DINTEREST_RATE -0.193892 5.485459 -0.035347 0.9723 
GDP 0.202236 3.413132 0.059252 0.9536 
INFLATION 3.605424 4.743769 0.760033 0.4598 
     
     R-squared 0.107711  Mean dependent variable 0.230239 
Adjusted R-squared -0.083494  S.D. dependent variable 0.180452 
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S.E. of regression 0.187834  Akaike information criterion -0.313383 
Sum squared residuals 0.493944  Schwarz criterion -0.115522 
Log likelihood 6.820444  Hannan–Quinn criterion -0.286100 
F-statistic 0.563325  Durbin–Watson stat 0.225885 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.648036    
     
     
 
 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test 
   
Series: LEVERAGE GDP DINTEREST_RATE2 INFLATION   
Date: 01/20/17 Time: 23:52   
Sample: 2006–2015    
Included observations: 20   
Cross-sections included: 2   
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration   
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend  
User-specified lag length: 1   
Newey–West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
      
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic -0.461862  0.6779 -0.319435  0.6253 
Panel rho-Statistic  0.753911  0.7745  0.809696  0.7909 
Panel PP-Statistic -0.333369  0.3694 -0.055121  0.4780 
Panel ADF-Statistic  1.421246  0.9224  1.741191  0.9592 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  1.532871  0.9373   
Group PP-Statistic  0.441040  0.6704   
Group ADF-Statistic  2.713193  0.9967   
      
            
Cross-section specific results   
      
      Phillips-Peron results (non-parametric)  
      
Cross ID AR(1) Variance HAC  Bandwidth Obs. 
 1 0.203 0.000819 0.000873 1.00 8 
 2 0.097 0.007944 0.008709 1.00 8 
      
Augmented Dickey-Fuller results (parametric)  
      
Cross ID AR(1) Variance Lag Max lag Obs. 
 1 0.475 0.000836 1 -- 7 
 2 0.218 0.008670 1 -- 7 
      
      
 
 
  
53 
 
Macroeconomic conditions regression 
 
Dependent Variable: COVERAGE_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 01/21/17 Time: 01:18   
Sample (adjusted): 2010–2015   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 2   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 12  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
     
     C 0.056333 0.014582 3.863200 0.0083 
DINTEREST_RATE -6.416003 0.996393 -6.439226 0.0007 
DINTEREST_RATE(-1) 0.392349 1.410470 0.278169 0.7902 
DINTEREST_RATE(-2) -0.921179 0.984862 -0.935339 0.3857 
DINTEREST_RATE(-3) 2.155325 0.817852 2.635348 0.0388 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.964419 Mean dependent variable 0.098083 
Adjusted R-squared 0.934768 S.D. dependent variable 0.105674 
S.E. of regression 0.026990 Akaike information criterion -4.079858 
Sum squared residuals 0.004371 Schwarz criterion -3.837405 
Log likelihood 30.47915 Hannan–Quinn criterion -4.169623 
F-statistic 32.52562 Durbin–Watson stat 1.270118 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000284    
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: COVERAGE_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 01/21/17 Time: 01:20   
Sample (adjusted): 2010–2015   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 2   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 12  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
     
     C 0.056333 0.027706 2.033211 0.0815 
DINTEREST_RATE -6.416003 1.893196 -3.388980 0.0116 
DINTEREST_RATE(-1) 0.392349 2.679962 0.146401 0.8877 
DINTEREST_RATE(-2) -0.921179 1.871286 -0.492271 0.6376 
DINTEREST_RATE(-3) 2.155325 1.553959 1.386990 0.2080 
     
     R-squared 0.850136 Mean dependent variable 0.098083 
Adjusted R-squared 0.764499 S.D. dependent variable 0.105674 
S.E. of regression 0.051282 Akaike information criterion -2.808616 
Sum squared residuals 0.018409 Schwarz criterion -2.606571 
Log likelihood 21.85169 Hannan–Quinn criterion -2.883420 
F-statistic 9.927249 Durbin–Watson stat 0.301556 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.005180    
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Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test 
 
 
  
Series: COVERAGE_RATIO DINTEREST_RATE    
Date: 01/21/17 Time: 01:41   
Sample: 2006–2015    
Included observations: 20   
Cross-sections included: 2   
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration   
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend  
User-specified lag length: 1   
Newey–West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
      
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic -0.576112  0.7177 -0.632648  0.7365 
Panel rho-Statistic  1.024836  0.8473  0.972729  0.8347 
Panel PP-Statistic  1.170652  0.8791  1.015598  0.8451 
Panel ADF-Statistic  1.856722  0.9683  1.056897  0.8547 
      
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  1.626841  0.9481   
Group PP-Statistic  1.746365  0.9596   
Group ADF-Statistic  2.059837  0.9803   
      
      
 
 
